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Abstract—The secondary control in direct current microgrids
(MGs) is used to restore the voltage deviations caused by the
primary droop control, where the latter is implemented locally
in each distributed generator and reacts to load variations.
Numerous recent works propose to implement the secondary
control in a distributed fashion, relying on a communication
system to achieve consensus among MG units. This paper shows
that, if the system is not designed to cope with adversary
communication impairments, then a malicious attacker can apply
a simple jamming of a few units of the MG and thus compromise
the secondary MG control. Compared to other denial-of-service
attacks that are oriented against the tertiary control, such as
economic dispatch, the attack on the secondary control presented
here can be more severe, as it disrupts the basic functionality of
the MG.
I. INTRODUCTION
Microgrid (MG) control is typically organized according to
a hierarchical architecture [1] to differentiate among control
objectives, as each of them has different requests in terms of
time scale and quantity of information needed. The primary
control adjusts the electrical parameters based only on local
measurements. A common approach for the primary control
is to use the droop method, which is simple to implement,
but at the same time causes the grid voltage deviation. The
secondary control is used to compensate these deviations and
can be implemented in a centralized or distributed fashion,
where in both cases a support of a communication system is
required. Finally, the optimization functionalities, such as, e.g.,
economic dispatch, are grouped in the tertiary control.
There is a growing interest in the MG research community
to use wireless communications for achieving coordination
among Distributed Generators (DGs), due to their plug-and-
play capability and greater flexibility compared to a cabled
system. Another favorable point is the broadcast nature of the
communication, that permits the implementation of distributed
coordination algorithms [2]-[4]. The benefits of a distributed
approach are the absence of a single point of failure and
lower bandwidth requirements. The suitable communication
technologies for MG control are preferred to be low-cost and
easy to implement, such as, e.g., Wi-Fi or ZigBee [5].
The use of a wireless technology exposes the system to
multiple security attacks, notably the jamming attacks. In
this work we study the performance of distributed secondary
MG control supported by WiFi, i.e., 802.11 networking, in
case of jamming attack. Specifically, we show that a simple
jamming strategy, which exploits only the periodicity of the
communication among DGs and attacks just a subset of DGs,
leads to a failure of the voltage restoration. We also present
possible countermeasures to this attack.
The organization of the rest of the text is as follows.
Section II contains a classification of denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks and the related work in context of MG control. In Sec-
tion III we present the MG model, consisting of an electrical
part, distributed control and communication protocol, as well
as models of the interference and the jammer. In Section IV
we analyze the overall system and state the control objective.
The impact of the jamming and the potential countermeasures
are presented in Section V. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Various DoS attacks can be conducted against a 802.11
network by a jammer, which is defined as an entity who is
purposefully trying to interfere with the physical transmission
and reception of wireless communications [6]. The DoS attacks
by jammers are classified as basic and intelligent [7]. Basic
jammers transmit a jamming signal either constantly, randomly
or as reactive jammers, which are activated only during the
transmissions that are intended to be jammed. In this way,
the jammer reduces energy consumption and the probability
of being detected. This attack results in back-off freezing of
all the stations that are in the jammer transmission range. On
the other hand, an intelligent jammer can try to corrupt the
control messages, such as acknowledgment packets. If the
jammer is capable of packet forging, it can perform more
sophisticated attacks exploiting protocol weaknesses, such as
the deauthentication attack, the virtual carrier sense attack, or
cryptographic-caused DoS, cf. [8].
The importance of the resilience to DoS attacks has been
already underlined in the smart grid literature [9]. Specifi-
cally, the attacks can be conducted against the confidentiality,
integrity and availability of the communication channel: we
are interested in the availability of the communication for the
distributed secondary MG control. Some related works show
countermeasures to attacks against the economic dispatch or
other tertiary control objectives, e.g., a regret matching based
anti-jamming algorithm is considered in [10]. Regarding the
secondary control, it is noted in [11] that the most critical
phase is the change of operation mode, but the considered
system has a centralized control. In this work, we show that
an attack to the distributed secondary control leads to more
severe consequences and can undermine the grid stability.
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Fig. 1. System model.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a residential DC microgrid operating in an
islanded mode (i.e., disconnected from the main grid), inspired
by a reference model from [12] and depicted in Fig. 1(a). There
are N = 6 DG units interconnected via electrical distribution
lines and regulated by a hierarchical controller, Fig. 1(b).
A. Control Model
Although the primary control roughly distributes the power
among DGs, its accuracy largely depends on electrical pa-
rameters and the voltage deviations appear. The secondary
control is used to eliminate these deviations by generating two
compensation terms δvI and δvDC that are fed back to the
primary controller:
δvI =
(
Kisc
s
+Kpsc
)
· (¯iL − iL), (1)
δvDC =
(
Kpsv
s
+Kisv
)
· (Vr − v¯DC), (2)
where i¯L and v¯DC are the estimated average values of the
output currents and voltage, Vr is the voltage reference value,
Kisc, Kisv and Kpsc, Kpsv are the integral and proportional
terms of the PI controllers, respectively, and s is the Laplace
operator [12].
In order to obtain the estimated average values, a consensus
algorithm can be implemented in DG controllers [3], which
are equipped with 802.11 radio interfaces. To a networked DG
we refer as an agent, following the nomenclature used in the
literature. The correction terms are computed locally every Tca
seconds via the consensus algorithm, which operates on the in-
formation sent by agents that are in the communication range.
Specifically, in each interval of Tca, there is a subinterval of
length Tu, Tu ≤ Tca, dedicated to the exchanges of the status
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Fig. 2. Time scale and consensus sampling period.
updates among the units (i.e., communication), after which
the collected information are given as input to the consensus
block, see Fig. 2. Thus, the consensus is a periodic process
with steps kTca + Tu, k ≥ 0. Ideally, if all communication
updates are received within Tu, the output of the consensus is
xi(k + 1) = Wii xi(k) +
∑
j∈Ni
Wij(xj(k)− xi(k)), (3)
where xi = [¯iL,i, v¯DC,i] is the state of the i-th agent, Wij are
the weight coefficients, andNi denotes the set of the neighbors
of i-th agent. In this work we assume that Wii = 1, ∀i, and
Wij = , i 6= j, i.e., Wij are constant, as in [13].
B. Communication Model
The communication objective is to periodically deliver the
agent state information to neighbors in a reliable way. The
communication graph is assumed to be connected and, thus,
allows for the convergence of the consensus. We assume that
there are two impairments to communication reliability: (i)
unintentional interference from, e.g., a domestic access point
that provides services to the inhabitants, and (ii) intentional
interference by the attacker (jammer) that is located in prox-
imity of the agents, with a goal of compromising the MG
communications. The agents are communicating with a low
and fixed modulation scheme, and the length of the packet
payload exchanged by the agents is also constant. Therefore,
the on-air time of a packet is constant and assumed to be equal
to Tp. The agents are broadcasting packets using the medium
access control regulated by the 802.11 distributed coordination
function (DCF).
1) IEEE 802.11 DCF: The DCF mechanism in the IEEE
802.11 standard is a carrier sense multiple access with col-
lision avoidance (CSMA/CA) and exponential back-off. The
carrier sensing is performed by the clear channel assessment
(CCA) module that reports if the channel is busy or idle.
When a station has a packet in the transmission queue, it
starts sensing the channel status. If the channel is sensed
idle for a distributed-inter-frame-space (DIFS) interval, the
packet is sent. Otherwise, it starts the back-off procedure. A
back-off value is chosen randomly from [0,W − 1], where
W is the maximum back-off value. The station is allowed
to transmit only when the back-off counter reaches zero and
the channel is sensed idle. The channel state is updated every
carrier sense (CS) time-slot of σ seconds by the CCA. The
back-off value is decremented for each idle time slot. If the
channel is busy, the back-off is frozen until the channel is
sensed idle for a DIFS, after which decrementing continues.
After a successful transmission, the 802.11 DCF starts a new
back-off procedure, even if there are no enqueued packet; this
mechanism is referred to as post back-off. Finally, in case
of broadcast packets there is no acknowledgement from the
receiver and the value of the back-off window W is fixed.
The delay from the instant that a packet is sent to the
interface of a transmitting agent to the instant that its payload
is disposable for the secondary control of a receiving agent is:
TMAC = Tqueue + TDCF + Tp + Trx, (4)
where Tqueue is the time spent in the transmission queue,
TDCF is the time consumed by the contention mechanism, Tp
is the on-air time, and Trx is the time spent by the receiver
to forward the payload to the application layer. In this work
we assume that Trx = 0. Also, as packets contain consensus
updates, it is important to transmit the last generated update
as soon as possible. Thus, we disable the transmission queue,
i.e., we do not enqueue measurements that may have been
produced while waiting for the PHY layer to become available
for sending a new packet, and assume Tqueue = 0.
2) Communication Protocol: Each agent is producing a
new status update every Tca seconds and it is assumed that
all agents are synchronized. The updates represent packets’
payload and are sent to the transmission queue. At the end
of the transmission procedure, the agent stays in the receiving
state until the next measurement arrives. While in this state, it
receives neighbors packets and delivers the received updates
to the secondary control layer.
Clearly, if agents send the packet to the transmission queue
at the same time instant, the probability of on-air collision is
high. Thus, we decorrelate the transmission instants by adding
a delay before sending the packet to the transmission queue,
i.e., without modifying the MAC layer. This delay can be
random or deterministic; we decide for the latter approach
and set its value TAD proportional to the agent’s ID
TADi = σ(i− 1). (5)
Thus, the total delay observed by the packet transmitted by
the i-th agent becomes
Ttotali = TADi + TMAC . (6)
3) Unintentional Interference Model: While it is unrealistic
to assume that the MG is communicating over a completely
idle channel, it is also true that the interference pattern can be
extremely variable among different environments. In addition,
the study of its impact is not the aim of this work. Therefore,
we use a simple model: the unintentional interferer (UI) is
a 802.11 network where only one transmitter is producing
downlink traffic. The UI packets have constant lengths and
arrive according to a Poisson process with parameter λ to an
infinite length transmission buffer. The interferer follows the
DCF rules in a fair way. Fig. 3 shows how the information
exchange is seen by an external observer; for the way we have
designed the protocol, it appears as a periodic packet burst.
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Fig. 3. The channel status seen by an external observer, Tca = 0.025 s.
4) Jammer Model: The attacker is using an off-the-shelf
802.11 device to transmit random packets, causing back-off
freezing and collisions to the MG agents communication.
Note that if the jammer freezes all agents and denies them
communication, then the convergence is simply delayed and
this can be detected rather easily. Therefore, we assume that
the output power of the jammer is limited, corrupting the
communication of only a subset of agents. In Section V we
show that such a simple jammer can make a great impact on
the secondary MG control.
To reduce the number of jamming packets, we provide the
jammer with a strategy that classifies it in the category of
the reactive jammers. Since the network is using broadcast
packets, the MG is protected against control packet attacks,
but the jammer can take advantage of the fact that the trans-
missions are periodic. In fact, the MG communication appears
to an external observer as a burst of N packets every Tca. The
period is continuously estimated as Tˆca by the attacker simply
sniffing the MG packets and accumulating their statistics. The
periodicity between two transmissions of an agent of each unit
is averaged to minimize the error due to the CSMA/CA. At
the same time, the jammer prepares a new packet every q · Tˆca
seconds. The trigger for its transmission is the observation of a
packet from any of the agents, as it signals the beginning of a
packet burst, and q ≤ 1 is a correction term added to have the
trigger ready at the beginning of the burst. The jamming packet
is transmitted also if the channel is busy, i.e., the attacker is not
respecting the DCF fairness. This reactive jamming algorithm
is simple and easy to implement, as it just needs the trace of
received packets and produces as output a random packet sent
on the wireless link. To further reduce its detection probability,
the jammer camouflages itself as the UI: this is achieved by
using the same packet size and transmission scheme as the UI,
as well as spoofing the UI’s MAC address.
TABLE I
CONTROL PARAMETERS.
Primary control
Virtual resistance Voltage PI loop Current PI loop
Rd = 0.2 Ω Kpv = 4, Kiv = 800 Kpc = 1, Kic = 97
Secondary control
Consensus weight Voltage PI loop Current PI loop
 = 0.025 Kpsv = 0.02, Kisv = 2 Kpsc = 0.02, Kisc = 1
IV. ANALYSIS
There are three aspects of the control that are related to the
channel impairments: the sampling period, the delay and the
reliability [14]. The sampling period is Tca and corresponds to
the rate at which a new status update is generated based on the
local measurements. The control delay, i.e., the time interval
needed by an agent to collect all the neighbors samples,
depends on the communication latency and bandwidth. The
values of Tu and Tca are selected to guarantee an acceptably
short control delay, without compromising the reliability. In
this work we set for simplicity Tu = Tca; even if part of the
agents could receive the packets from all neighbors before Tca,
they all compute (3) at the same instant.
The channel unreliability can cause the absence of some
of the neighbor’s information at the input of the consensus
block due to packet loss. We refer to this event as feedback
fault. It is necessary to define a strategy to adopt in case of
missing feedback. The topic is widely discussed in Networked
Control System (NCS) literature [15]: in principle the strategy
depends on the application, in particular how the system uses
the output of the consensus algorithm. The approach used in
this work is the following. At Tu the agent checks if all the
neighbors information is received: if so, it can compute (3)
and save the result in a memory. Otherwise, it discards all the
received packets and outputs the value saved in the memory
that corresponds to the last successful update period. Another
approach is to estimate the content of missing packets using
the information received in the past, but it requires the study
and evaluation of a proper method.1
The feedback fault can happen only for a subset of the
agents. In this case at the decision instant only a part of agents
will update their reference, while others continue keeping
the previous one that was stored in the local memory. Thus,
we distinguish between two classes of feedback faults. A
coordinated fault is detected by all the agents, and in practice
can happen when the channel is busy for an entire Tca, i.e.,
there is total absence of communication. In this case, all the
agents will continue to use the previous value as reference. An
uncoordinated fault occurs when part of the agents received
all the feedbacks and are able to compute (3), while the others
are not able to do it because part of the feedback is missing.
The fault is caused by the fact that an agent cannot have
the certainty that its neighbor received the packet because the
1Our investigations showed that a simple strategy in which the content of
a missing packet is replaced by the last successfully received value produces
results that are worse than the ones presented in Section V. A more detailed
study is left for future work.
TABLE II
COMMUNICATION PARAMETERS.
Parameter Value
Time slot duration σ 20 µs
Propagation delay 2 µs
Data rate 1 Mbps
PHY duration 96 µs
MAC header 272 bit
DIFS 32 µs
Contention window size W 32
communication loop is not closed, and the consequence is the
loss of coordination among agents. This is the kind of fault
exploited by the jammer in our scenario.
Secondary Control Objective: For the evaluation of the
impact of the jamming attack, we need to clearly define the
secondary control objectives, which are (i) the equal current
sharing among DGs and (ii) the voltage restoration to Vr. The
imbalanced current sharing may result in overloading or even
unintentional shut-down of some DGs, interrupting the system
operation. On the other hand, as the voltage deviation affects
the performance of electric appliances, the MG voltage should
be kept at nominal value. Moreover, in case of an islanded
MG, the over-voltage issue may cause inverse current flow to
some of the DG units, inducing damages to the generation
side. Depending on the standardization, the tolerance on the
deviation from Vr may vary; in this work, we admit an absolute
error of 5% and 10% on the steady state voltage, following
the reference values used for MGs [16]. Moreover, in order
to support the control objectives, the corresponding properties
are requested from the consensus algorithm [17]:
P1 Termination: every DG decides for a state,
P2 Validity: the voltage state estimated by each DG is Vr,
P3 Agreement: every DG decides for the same state,
which we also investigate in the paper.
V. THE IMPACT OF JAMMING
We investigate the impact of the jamming attack during the
transient phase that follows the activation of the secondary
control. We base our study on the system used in [3]: the
parameters used for the primary and secondary control are
listed in Table I; Tca is set to 25 ms, guaranteeing the stability
of the control; Vr is fixed to 48 V; there are N = 6 DGs in the
MG and the consensus topology is a full mesh, i.e., all agents
are neighbors of each other. The control is implemented in
Simulink and uses PLECS software for the electrical model.
The communication system consists of 802.11g devices with
parameters reported in Table II and simulated in MATLAB.
The packet payload contains the consensus states of voltage
and current, an incremental packet ID and encryption over-
head, totaling 10 bytes. The UI is also a 802.11g device that
transmits with the same parameters as in Table II, with payload
length of 512 bytes and packet arrival intensity of λ = 100 s−1.
The jammer attacks agents 4 and 5, see Fig. 1(a), waiting idle
in their proximity until the first packet exchanged by the agents
in the MG is captured. Then it starts the attack, estimating
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Fig. 4. Comparison between the sampling period estimated by the jammer
and the actual one.
in the same time the packet burst period Tca; a realization
of the estimation is plotted in Fig. 4. The value of q (see
Section III-B4) is set to 0.8. If a packet is partially jammed,
agents 4 and 5 are not able to decode it. If it’s corrupted by
the collision with the UI or with another agent, no agent can
decode it. These are the two sources of packet loss.
Initially, only the primary control is active and the voltage
is not the requested one. At t = 1 s both the secondary control
and the communications are activated and, after a transition
period, a steady state is achieved. We report in Fig. 5 the
consensus states obtained from a simulation instance in a
channel with the UI only and in a jammed channel. Obviously,
the system is able to cope with the UI, i.e., all properties P1-P3
are satisfied. In case of jamming, the first observation is that
the convergence speed is affected. Regarding the steady state
correctness, Fig. 6 shows the output current from each DG and
the grid voltage for the same simulation instances. Although
the equal power sharing goal is achieved, grid voltage is
restored to the wrong value of 52.25 V, i.e., the error is 8.85%.
Fig. 7 shows steady state voltage in the jammed scenario
obtained over 1000 simulation runs. Obviously, jamming sig-
nificantly deviates the voltage, both during the transient phase,
as well as when the steady state is reached. In particular,
the absolute error on the steady state voltage is greater than
5% with probability 0.089 and than 10% with probability
0.013. These are significant values, especially as they are
consequences of a simple jamming strategy. Moreover, as the
MG operation involves occasional load changes, when a new
steady state has to be reached, there is a considerable potential
to compromise MG stability with such a jammer.
A. Possible Countermeasures
The disconnection of the attacked agents can be considered,
but is clearly a drastic solution, as it decreases the energy offer:
this motivates the need of a system adaptation. The purposed
solution is based on the fact that consensus interval is much
longer than the on-air time of the exchanged packets; i.e.,
since Tca  N Tp, we can spread the channel access by the
agents during consensus interval to decrease the probability of
jamming. This is achieved modifying the TAD, see (5), and
defining Te ≤ Tca as the part of Tca used for the AD. We then
divide Te in N intervals and let the i-th agent transmitting in
the interval corresponding to its ID. The modified TAD is
TADi = (i− 1)
Te
N
. (7)
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Fig. 5. An example of the evolution of the consensus states, (a)-(b) channel
with UI only, (c)-(d) jammed channel.
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As the use of large Te increases the probability of status
updates being received after the deadline Tca due to the
CSMA/CA, its value should be carefully selected. In Figure 8
we show the results obtained with Te = 12 ms, a value that
showed the most of the improvement in our investigations. The
corresponding results are presented in Fig. 8: the steady-state
voltage value is greater than 48 ± 5% with probability 0.051
and greater than 48 ± 10% with probability 0.001. Although
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Fig. 7. Simulation results.
this solution shows some benefits, they are modest and, in
essence, inadequate. A better protection may be obtained by
more sophisticated methods, like communication anti-jamming
techniques and fault tolerant consensus algorithms.
There are many countermeasures against jamming attacks in
the communication literature, like frequency-hopping spread-
spectrum (FHSS), direct-sequence spread-spectrum (DSSS),
or even the use of directional antenna [7], but they require
coordination among agents. Finally, the consensus literature
offers interesting strategies that can be applied to the sec-
ondary control, e.g., by using broadcast gossip algorithms [18]
or double-iteration algorithms [19]. As there is a trade-off
between the communication complexity and the convergence
speed [20], the selection of the optimal adjacency matrix
in presence of jamming is an open problem. In addition, a
distributed mechanism is needed to check that the graph is
strongly connected to guarantee the convergence.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a potential weakness of the
distributed MG control that has not received attention before.
Its impact is significant, as an attacker can strike the low-level
functionality of the MG, i.e., the voltage restoration, using a
simple jamming technique. Indeed, if the secondary control
communication is intended to rely on a wireless system, it
should include adaptation and protection mechanisms. Finally,
we underlined how different components of the system can
contribute to the mitigation of jamming attacks and motivated
the future research about robust secondary control schemes.
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